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PROUST WASN’T A NEUROSCIENTIST
MURRAY SMITH
My response falls into two parts. In the first part, I begin by addressing 
the concerns raised by Sherri Irvin regarding the role of neuroscience within
the model of triangulation advanced by Film, Art, and the Third Culture (hereafter:
FACT). This leads me through a variety of considerations, including the distinction
between explanandum and explanans, the nature of the supervenience relation
holding between neural states on the one hand and psychological and
phenomenological states on the other, and the methodological or episte -
mological character of triangulation. In unpacking the latter claim, I draw
a comparison between biological motion and the biological – or, better,
biocultural – cognition that a naturalistic approach to the mind points us
towards. In the second part of my response, I pick up on Elisabeth Schellekens’s
focus on the phenomenology of aesthetic experience, and my particular
conception of it. I seek to allay Schellekens’s worry that my account of aesthetic
experience encompasses ‘too much’ by emphasizing again the importance of
the explanandum–explanans distinction, and relatedly, by stressing the distinction
between the content of aesthetic experience and the explanation of such
experience. I stress the differences between the explanatory goals of the theorist
with the creative and aesthetic goals of the artist (while acknowledging that
theorists need to observe a principle of explanatory relevance, lest their theories
become ‘bloated’ in the way Schellekens fears). I conclude by arguing that
a naturalized aesthetics is able to accommodate the particularity of specific
artworks and of individual appreciators, and that such accommodation is not in
tension with the tradition of scientific psychology.
I
In her commentary, Sherri Irvin recognizes the centrality of the triangulation
model to the project advanced in FACT – the effort to coordinate evidence from
introspection and phenomenal reflection, psychology, and neuroscience in 
the study of the mind in general, and in relation to aesthetics and aesthetic
experience in particular. In commenting on the model and the book, Irvin points
to a number of ways in which we share common ground. In agreement with both
Irvin and Elisabeth Schellekens – and indeed, I believe, with Nanay – I take 
the clarification and explanation of aesthetic experience to be central to the
enterprise of philosophical aesthetics. Irvin also notes the ‘anti-reductivist flavour’
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of FACT, notwithstanding the seriousness with which I take (neuro)science.1 One
way in which this is manifest, as Irvin points out,2 is in my concern with the
overreaching and ‘overinterpretation’ widespread in cognitive neuroscience, where
bold claims and speculative edifices are built on the basis of preliminary and often
very limited neural evidence. The most sustained critique of this tendency is to be
found in Chapter 2 of FACT, where I coin the expression ‘neural behaviourism’ to
describe and refer to that strain of neuroscience which treats neurophysiological
evidence as if it spoke for itself – as if it were meaningful without being intermapped
onto evidence from experience and psychological theory.
But Irvin has doubts about the level of confidence that I place in neuroscience
(or at least the neuroscience currently available to us): the findings of
contemporary neuroscience, she states, ‘tend to be pretty primitive’ and ‘coarse-
grained’.3 More specifically and more fundamentally, Irvin challenges my view
that there is an ‘interdependence’ among the three types or levels of evidence
which makes it impossible to hierarchize their significance. She argues that, at
least with respect to aesthetic experience, there is an asymmetry among the levels
which makes phenomenological evidence – the evidence of experience itself –
the most significant kind of evidence available to us. She holds this because ‘when
it comes to art and aesthetic experience, the phenomenological is irreducibly not
just one of the legitimate targets of our interest, but the primary one’.4 Irvin also
contends that, so long as we hold that mental properties supervene on neural
properties, psychological evidence takes priority over neural evidence. I’ll return
to the topic of supervenience shortly. But the immediate point to take stock of is
that, on Irvin’s view, in contrast to mine, there is a clear hierarchy among the three
types of evidence constitutive of triangulation, in which phenomenology is at
the top and neurophysiology at the bottom (neural evidence is ‘subservient’
to the other kinds of evidence).5
Note, however, that there appears to be a strong and a weak version of Irvin’s
objection to the role of neuroscience in aesthetics. Certain passages in her
commentary imply that the problem is (or might be) that neuroscience is too
young as a science either to make much of a contribution, or for us to know
whether it might make such a contribution, to our understanding of aesthetic
experience: 
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1 Sherri Irvin, ‘The Nature of Aesthetic Experience and the Role of the Sciences in
Aesthetic Theorizing: Remarks on the Work of Nanay and Smith’, Estetika: The Central
European Journal of Aesthetics 56 (2019): 105.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., 105, 107.
4 Ibid., 107.
5 Ibid., 106.
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the suggestion that the three levels exist in ‘a tail-chasing form of interdependence’
strikes me as premature: the present coarse-grained state of much neuroscientific
knowledge doesn’t permit it to have a very robust explanatory role. It remains to 
be seen whether the apparent primacy of the experiential level will recede as 
the underlying neuroscience becomes more sophisticated.6
Other passages imply a stronger, more conceptual objection, based on the fact
that both our experiences and our psychological capacities supervene on neural
states and processes. Given this, Irvin argues, ‘the prospect of neurophysiological
data making an independent contribution to aesthetic theorizing, even once the
science is far more advanced’, is in doubt.7
Here it is important to introduce two rejoinders to the strong version of Irvin’s
objection. The first concerns the peculiar status and role of experiential evidence
in the model of triangulation advanced by FACT. Such experience, I argue, plays
a dual role in theories of aesthetic experience: it functions as both explanandum
and explanans.8 How can that be? As Irvin stresses, our aesthetic experience –
whether of artworks, natural phenomena, or the facets of everyday experience –
is the very thing which theories of aesthetic experience seek to explain. But
I contend that, additionally, what we have to say about aesthetic experience –
the way it feels to us; the way we characterize it – plays a role in our explanations
of such experience. This is one of the peculiarities of the science of mind which
marks it off from all other domains of science, where the pursuit of the ‘view
from nowhere’ is an appropriate governing ideal. That ideal of course has an
important place in the cognitive sciences as well. But unless we take the stance
that the ‘view from somewhere’ – the data of first-person experience – is entirely
epiphenomenal, experiential evidence is bound to figure in our explanations,
even if such evidence is defeasible. 
To take one example from FACT: according to the orthodox theory of suspense,
suspense arises when, in engaging with an unfolding sequence of events, we
hope for certain outcomes, fear for others, and, crucially, lack knowledge of
the outcome. But this gives rise to the problem of ‘anomalous suspense’9 – 
the apparent experience of suspense in contexts where we do know the outcome
of the narrative in question (either because it is a well-known real-world narrative
or because of repeated engagements with specific fictional narratives). Various
solutions to this problem are possible, some of which hold that the emotion we
6 Ibid., 108. 
7 Ibid., 100.
8 Murray Smith, Film, Art, and the Third Culture: A Naturalized Aesthetics of Film (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2017), 62.
9 Richard Gerrig, Experiencing Narrative Worlds: On the Psychological Activities of Reading
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993).
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experience in such contexts really is suspense. But if we wish to defend the idea
that suspense is or can be experienced where we already know the outcome of
a narrative, experiential evidence will be relevant. Thus when my body tightens
up at the prospect of the hijacking of the flight depicted in United 93, and it feels
to me like I am experiencing suspense in relation to that possible event, that
counts as one form of evidence in favour of the hypothesis that I am experiencing
suspense.
We need to be careful here with regard to what the evidence of experience is
evidence of – what exactly is the explanandum? There are two candidates: our
experience itself and the psychological capacity associated with the experience.
Can our experience be evidence of our experience? There is something worryingly
circular about that thought. Our experience (qua experience) just is constitutive
of what we want to explain, and in that sense we can’t be wrong about our
experience. But we can be mistaken about the psychological skill or capacity
the exercise of which creates the experience. As I note in FACT, our ordinary
experience gives us the impression that our visual system affords us a uniformly
coloured and detailed visual field. But as research on peripheral vision and on
inattentional and change blindness shows, it doesn’t! Christopher Chabris and
Dan Simons refer to this phenomenon as the ‘illusion of attention’. They note that
‘we vividly experience some aspects of our world, particularly those that are
the focus of our attention. But this rich experience inevitably leads to 
the erroneous belief that we process all of the detailed information around us.’ So
our visual experience is characterized by this illusion, and such experience gives
rise to mistaken beliefs about our visual capacities.10 (The same may be true of
suspense; our experience of what feels like suspense in anomalous cases, like
those noted above, may be misleading; the jury is out.) Thus it is cogent to think
of our visual experience as evidence for our capacities or skills – misleading
evidence, as it turns out in this case – in a way that it isn’t cogent to think of
experience as evidence of experience.
My second response to the strong version of Irvin’s objection focuses on the
role of supervenience. Irvin and I are in agreement ‘that the phenomenological
and the functional/cognitive supervene on the physiological’.11 But we differ on
the significance of this relationship. While I grant that there is an ontological
hierarchy among the levels in the triangulation model,12 I insist on two further
points. First, that the more basic level of neurophysiology in the ontological
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10 Smith, Film, Art, and the Third Culture, 61, 235nn11–13; Christopher Chabris and Dan
Simons, The Invisible Gorilla: And Other Ways Our Intuition Deceives Us (London:
HarperCollins, 2010), 7.
11 Irvin, ‘Nature of Aesthetic Experience’, 107.
12 Smith, Film, Art, and the Third Culture, 234n6.
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hierarchy should not lead us to make any fallacious inferences about the (ir)reality
of psychological states or conscious experiences: the ontological hierarchy gives
us no reason to think that the mind in general or consciousness in particular are
any less real than the brain states on which they supervene. Although Irvin does
not address this point, I am confident that here, too, we are in agreement. 
Where there is a difference, if not a disagreement, between us concerns 
the nature of triangulation. At least by implication, Irvin treats triangulation as an
ontological claim; that is what the supervenience relation describes. But I frame
triangulation in methodological terms: ‘no item within these bodies of evidence
is insulated from revision or rejection – so elimination of even long-established,
cherished beliefs and theories is certainly possible. In addition, no straightforward
methodological hierarchy among the three levels of analysis is established: no
one of the three types of evidence necessarily overrules the others.’13 The idea
here is that, in our search for an understanding of the mind and of aesthetic
experience, we can begin with evidence of any type – experiential, functional,
neural – as all of them will (or at least can) lead us into the space of explanation,
where any given piece of evidence may intersect with any other. I grant that, given
supervenience, differences at the base level of the brain may not manifest in
differences at the supervening level of the mind; but of course they can and
often do, and that is all that is necessary to ‘license’ attention to neural evidence
from a methodological point of view. The example of mirror neurons is telling
in this respect: mirror neurons were initially discovered by accident when 
the neuroscientists involved were running experiments designed to test for
a quite different set of hypotheses about brain function in macaque monkeys.14
But once this unexpected and anomalous neural data was on the table,
hypotheses about the functional and experiential states it might be underpinning
could be (and were) framed. Note that this is precisely why I don’t claim that
‘neurophysiological data [makes] an independent contribution to aesthetic
theorizing’,15 but rather that it exists in a relation of interdependence with
functional and experiential states. This interdependence claim cuts both ways as
far as neuroscience is concerned – neural evidence is given a significant role, but
it degenerates into meaningless ‘neurobabble’ if cut loose from experiential and
functional evidence and interpretation.
One might also make this methodological point in epistemological terms:
triangulation bears on how we gain knowledge of the mind – how we discover
its mechanisms, processes, and other characteristics. It leaves the ontological
13 Ibid., 60.
14 Ibid., 64–65.
15 Irvin, ‘Nature of Aesthetic Experience’, 100 (my emphasis).
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hierarchy, described by the supervenience relation, intact. Ontologically, a tiger
is a tiger because of its genetic make-up; but we get to know if a tiger is a tiger by
looking at its observable features and behaviour. What cuts ice epistemically may
be ontologically blunt.
What more can be said in support of the methodological and epistemological
value of triangulation in general and the neural level of evidence embedded
within it in particular? In a striking passage which resonates strongly with those
trends in contemporary philosophy of mind which accord substantial weight to
the body and the brain – such as embodied and 4EA accounts of the mind –
Darwin recorded the following thought in one of his notebooks: 
To study Metaphysic, as they have always been studied, appears to me to be like puzzling
at Astronomy without Mechanics. – Experience shows the problem of the mind cannot
be solved by attacking the citadel itself. – The mind is a function of the body. – We must
bring some stable foundation to argue from.16
We might consider Darwin’s idea here in connection with the literature on
biological motion. It is now well established within perceptual psychology that
our minds are adapted to detecting the distinctive contours and rhythms of
biological motion, as it is manifest in the movement of humans and other animal
species. Among the possible forms of motion, biological motion is quite
distinctive, and quite different from the artificial, technologically enhanced forms
of motion we humans have invented. (Of course, it is a racing certainty that some
future technologies will emulate biological motion, for various purposes.) And
the distinctiveness of biological motion is ineluctably tied up with – one might
even say constituted by – the bodily forms of animals. Darwin is inviting us to
make the leap and accept that the mind, just as surely if rather more subtlety, is
tied up with the form of the body and the brain (the brain being nothing other
than a particularly intricate part of the body): ‘The mind is a function of the body.’
John Searle, Patricia and Paul Churchland, and a great many other contemporary
philosophers of mind would agree. Searle, for example, has argued that ‘the brain
is a biological organ, like any other, and consciousness is as much a biological
process as digestion or photosynthesis’.17 The mind cannot be understood without
an understanding of its architecture, and the architecture of the mind depends
Proust Wasn‘t a Neuroscientist
16 Charles Darwin, Charles Darwin’s Notebooks, 1836–1844: Geology, Transmutation of
Species, Metaphysical Enquiries, ed. Paul H. Barrett et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1987), Notebook N, 564; quoted in Smith, Film, Art, and the Third Culture,
57, 64.
17 John R. Searle, ‘Consciousness and the Philosophers’, review of The Conscious Mind:
In Search of a Fundamental Theory, by David J. Chalmers, New York Review of Books, 
6 March 1997, 50.
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at least in part on the architecture of the brain (or the brain-and-body). We can
speak not only of biological motion, but of biological cognition.
On this view, the brain is the vehicle of biology, the organ that evolved in
the human species in such a way as to create a behavioural and cognitive gulf
between Homo sapiens and all other species. But we should not take talk of
biological cognition to exclude culture as another shaping force in human
cognition. As I argue in Chapter 6, phylogenetically speaking, culture emerged
from our biology and then developed as an additional domain in which human
cognition is forged, in tandem with underlying biological processes; according
to one version of this view, human evolution has occurred through ‘gene-
meme co-evolution’.18 From an ontogenetic and development point of view,
the psychology we are left with must be understood in biocultural terms; talk of
‘biological cognition’ is not intended to deny or obscure the importance of culture
in cognition.19 Culturally shaped cognition is to biological cognition as artefactual
motion is to biological motion: both artefactual motion and cultural cognition
build on affordances in their respective domains, for movement in the physical
world and thought in the space of reasons and cognition. 
II
Schellekens, like Irvin, puts the nature of aesthetic experience at the centre of
her response, recognizing the significance of the issue to both FACT and
Aesthetics as Philosophy of Perception. She notes that both books are concerned
with what is ‘phenomenologically distinct about aesthetic experience’,20
arguing that this is a litmus test for any naturalistic account, since (Schellekens
contends) naturalism tends to be reductive, erasing the very distinctiveness
that it must capture and explain in order to succeed. Irvin, as we have seen,
remarks on the efforts I make to resist such reduction, giving rise to the ‘anti-
reductivist’ aroma of FACT. Schellekens captures my characterization of
aesthetic experience very effectively, drawing on the term retrospection to
evoke both the idea of ‘savouring’ rather than merely having an experience,
and to point to the complex temporality and reflexive intentionality implied by
this conception of aesthetic experience. ‘This “savouring” or “retrospection”,’
Schellekens writes, 
18 Robert Boyd and Peter J. Richerson, Not by Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human
Evolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
19 Consider, for example, the case of sociomoral disgust alluded to in my ‘Film, Art, and
the Third Culture: A Précis’, Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics 56 (2019):
98.
20 Elisabeth Schellekens, ‘Psychologizing Aesthetic Attention’, Estetika: The Central
European Journal of Aesthetics 56 (2019): 111, also 114.
Murray Smith
Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics, LVI/XII, 2019, No. 1, 00–00 131
Zlom1_2019_Sestava 1  5.4.19  8:01  Stránka 131
combines a whole host of states and abilities both in what we might call its production,
its phenomenology, and its aftermath. It is not only reflective and emotionally laden, it
is also self-reflective and affectively enjoyed as reflection or retrospection. We have an
experience and at the same time an experience of that experience: aesthetic experiences
are enjoyed, felt, and retrospected upon in a special way qua objects of a special form of
self-consciousness which is distinctive of aesthetic attention.21
In her commentary, Irvin sounds a note of dissent – or least notes an important
qualification – on this topic, to the effect that ‘savouring does not necessarily
imply enjoyment, but it does imply really tasting as opposed to just absently
swallowing’.22 While the pleasurable character of aesthetic experiences of which
Schellekens writes – such experiences are ‘enjoyed’ – appears to have a kind of
normative weight, neutral or negative aesthetic experiences are surely not only
possible, but part of the landscape of actual aesthetic experience. True, we ought
to seek positive aesthetic experiences, but often enough they fail or disappoint.
Likewise, we ought to seek the right and the good – but things don’t always work
out that way. ‘Disvalue’ is an aspect of both ethics and aesthetics.23 So what is basic
to aesthetic experience in this respect is keen and self-conscious attention to
the quality of the experience, however pleasurable or otherwise the experience
turns out to be.
Schellekens’s description, taken alongside Irvin’s qualification, pinpoints 
the kind of aesthetic experience I strive to theorize in FACT.24 But Schellekens
worries, if I can pursue the metaphor introduced by Irvin, that all may not be well
underneath the aroma and the flavour of the account. The description of 
the phenomenon to be explained – aesthetic experience – may be attractive;
the naturalistic theory advanced to explain it is greeted more cautiously.
Schellekens worries in particular that I am ‘trying to fit too much into the account
of what is supposed to be our distinctly aesthetic phenomenology’.25 I take it that
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21 Ibid. 115. Chapter 7 emphasizes the retrospective dimension of aesthetic experience,
especially as it bears on empathy (Smith, Film, Art, and the Third Culture, 196–97). There
may also be a connection between the retrospective aspect of aesthetic experience
and the ‘lingering effect’ of such experience, as discussed by Nanay and Schellekens.
See Bence Nanay, Aesthetics as Philosophy of Perception (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2016), 16–17; Schellekens, ‘Psychologizing Aesthetic Attention’, 112–14; Bence Nanay,
‘Responses to Irvin and Schellekens’, Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics
56 (2019): 120–22.
22 Irvin, ‘Nature of Aesthetic Experience’, 102.
23 On this point, see my review of Aesthetic Pursuits: Essays in the Philosophy of Art, by
Jerrold Levinson, Philosophy 93 (2018): 467–69.
24 Paisley Livingston has queried whether the conception of aesthetic experience
explored in FACT is, in fact, too narrow and too demanding. See Paisley Livingston,
‘Questions about Aesthetic Experience’, Projections 12 (2018): 71–75; and my response,
‘Film, Art, and the Third Culture – A Response’, Projections 12 (2018), 116–19.
25 Schellekens, ‘Psychologizing Aesthetic Attention’, 115.
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Schellekens’s worry here arises from the very ‘thickness’ of the thick explanation
that, as we have seen, she rightly adduces goes hand in hand with the metho -
dology of triangulation. If everything from neural networks and mental modules
to selection pressures and evolutionary niches to affect programs and extended
minds goes into the theoretical mix, what hope is there that the intricate structure
of retrospection is going to survive, let alone be discerned and explained?
Here again it is important to hang on to the explanandum–explanans
distinction. Those items which seem most alien to descriptions and explanations
of aesthetic experience, including neuroscientific evidence, reference to
subpersonal mechanisms and processes, as well as the adaptive unconscious and
implicit bias, play their role in the engine room of explanation. They bear upon
what Schellekens refers to in the quotation above as the ‘production’ of aesthetic
experience. Generally speaking, none of these factors shows up in our conscious
experience, even if their consequences do; and so none is part of the content of
aesthetic experience. ‘Exactly what do we find behind the “door [to] the first-
person perspective within a scientific approach to the mind”?’ asks Schellekens.26
We find, exactly, the contents of experience – what is available, with all its fallibility
and fragility, to introspection and phenomenological reflection. The point is
‘simply’ that, to reiterate one of my responses to Irvin, such aesthetic experience
is not only the target of explanation, but – conceived in functional terms, as 
a distinctive kind of capacity  –  one type of evidence that we can marshal
within the explanation of that very target phenomenon (see p. 128). It is easy to
understand how, given this dual role, it might seem like I am cluttering up 
the space of aesthetic experience itself with a lot of apparatus that doesn’t
belong there. That is why the explanandum–explanans distinction is so vital.
Relating my exploration of Edgar Reisz’s Heimat (1984–2013) to Nanay’s
treatment of certain works by Paul Klee, Schellekens suggests that these analyses
may ‘affect’ our experience of the artworks concerned.27 With regard to FACT,
however, affecting the appreciator’s experience is not my primary goal. That’s the
job, in the first instance, of the artist by means of the artwork, and, in the second,
of the critic through their criticism of the work. As a theorist, I would substitute
the word ‘explain’ for ‘affect’; explanation, once again, is the name of the game in
theory construction. I insist upon drawing firm lines between three roles we can
play in relation to artworks, and the distinct activities that playing these roles
entail: making artworks is distinct from appreciating them, and both are distinct
from explaining them. That is not to deny that there are points of connection and
similarity, nor that the same individual can occupy these different roles with
26 Ibid., 116, citing Smith, Film, Art, and the Third Culture, 117.
27 Schellekens, ‘Psychologizing Aesthetic Attention’, 116.
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respect to the same artwork at different times, nor that at a very abstract level, all
three activities might be absorbed into some super-category (of all phenomena
related to the aesthetic).
The distinct activities of making, appreciating, and explaining also relate to
Irvin’s sceptical attitude to the relevance of neuroscience, when she argues: 
we do not need to descend to the physiological level to make sense of [various examples
examined in Film, Art, and the Third Culture]: as Smith notes, artists know how to
manipulate audience attention and exploit unique features of the perceptual system in
order to produce distinctive aesthetic effects, and their knowledge is derived not from
neurophysiology but from careful observation of how certain kinds of effects captured
on film are productive of particular kinds of experience.28
As far as the activity of the artist is concerned, I agree. That is why, pace Jonah
Lehrer, Proust was not a neuroscientist.29 Lehrer makes the case that many of
the discoveries of cognitive neuroscience – for example, with respect to memory,
language, and visual perception – were prefigured in the work of artists such
as Marcel Proust, Gertrude Stein, and Paul Cézanne. I have no objection to 
the rhetorical conceit of Lehrer’s title: that artists can convey in artistic form an
understanding of aspects of the human mind, and that psychology often confirms
the wisdom of the arts. But we need to be wary of conflating the very different
kinds of enquiry and knowledge afforded by the arts and sciences. Proust
illuminated the mind, but his path to that illumination wasn’t via the scientific
study of the brain (as Lehrer well knows, of course). The theorist is engaged in
a different activity, and that is why drawing on the findings of neuroscience – if
not actually doing some neuroscience – take on a relevance and justification for
the theorist which they lack for the artist.
So Proust wasn’t a neuroscientist in the sense that he didn’t need to draw upon
neuroscience (or any scientific psychology) in order to create his works; nor do
we need to appeal to neuroscience or scientific psychology in order to appreciate
them. But if we want to theorize and explain why Proust’s techniques and novels
work as they do – and especially if we want to generate thick explanations – then
neuroscience (and scientific psychology in general) will be a useful resource.
Nonetheless, multilevel theories such as the one advanced in FACT do face
a problem of explanatory bloat – if we can move sideways into context, as 
the advocates of thick description urge, and downwards into the physical
structures subvening mental states and processes, as I contend by defending
a parallel notion of thick explanation, then where do we draw the line for what is
to count as explanatorily relevant? 
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The problem of explanatory bloat calls for a principle of explanatory relevance.
I can’t offer one here; but I can suggest the outline of such a principle through an
example from FACT. There I make the case that in shaping our responses to 
the antagonist in Saboteur (1942), through the mechanism of affective mimicry,
‘an aspect of the biology of emotions is enlisted [by Hitchcock] in a cultural and
political cause’.30 And I offer this up as a prime case of thick explanation. But not,
I hope, an indigestibly thick explanation. The explanation cuts a path across
the biological and cultural levels, identifying a particular set of causal factors:
Hitchcock intuitively understood – he was no more a neuroscientist than Proust
– through his experience as a film-maker, how the expressions and movements
of performers affected audiences, as is evident from both his film-making
practice and his reflections on his craft in interviews. And he was alert to 
the various constraints and pressures his films were subject to (including those
of the Production Code Administration, the Second World War, and more broadly,
the Hollywood system). 
Schellekens also suggests that questions ‘arise for anyone who seeks both
to naturalize (and in that sense at least normalize) and to customize 
the aesthetic at the same time’.31 Earlier in the same passage she suggests that
the alignment of naturalized aesthetics with scientific psychology might be
taken as an advantage, insofar as its ‘explanations are grounded in information,
facts, evidence, or data which in some sense at least apply across aesthetic
agents, regardless of all the purely personal, idiosyncratic qualities which can
make us such unreliable aesthetic judges’.32 Schellekens’s remarks on this topic
resonate with the focus of Chapter 8, which seeks to reconcile the traditional
emphasis on the particularity of art with the impetus towards generalization
characteristic of scientific and philosophical theorizing. There I argue that 
the incompatibility between art and these explanatory enterprises is more
perceived than real: a naturalistic theory of art can reveal those recurrent
patterns, widespread practices and shared experiences which are manifest in
the aesthetic universe, while setting into relief the unique and particular
aspects of individual artworks and other aesthetic objects. (Note that Nanay
explores the presumed ‘uniqueness’ of artworks, the ‘completely new and often
very rewarding experiences’ that they afford,33 and the implications of such
uniqueness for aesthetic evaluation, in Chapter 6 of Aesthetics as Philosophy of
Perception. He concludes, similarly, that the explanatory resources available in
30 Smith, Film, Art, and the Third Culture, 146.
31 Schellekens, ‘Psychologizing Aesthetic Attention’, 116.
32 Ibid.
33 Nanay, ‘Précis’, 92. 
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the philosophy of perception and vision science can shed light on uniqueness
in the aesthetic domain.)
The same principle applies to the idiosyncrasy of individuals. Scientific
psychology doesn’t deny that individuals vary in a myriad of ways; indeed some
branches of psychology – like personality psychology – focus on this very fact.
Human variability – individual and cultural – is a feature of human existence
which, one way or another, any scientific approach to human behaviour has to
take into account. And so this recognition must have a place within a naturalized
aesthetics. It is true that, when we assess the design features of an artwork, we
are seeking to understand how the work draws on certain human capacities and
existing knowledge in order to create a certain kind of experience. But it is no
strike against the theory to admit that, where particular perceivers lack the
appropriate background knowledge, or the perceptual or cognitive or emotional
capacities, or the right disposition to engage with the work, then the qualia the
work is designed to elicit will not emerge and the experience will not be had. In
fact any other conclusion would be inconsistent with the scientific temper of
naturalistic philosophy, since the background knowledge, the mental capacities,
and the appropriate disposition are all causal preconditions for the work to work
as it has been designed to work.34 Both Nanay, in Aesthetics and Philosophy of
Perception, and Todd Berliner, in his recent Hollywood Aesthetic, make the point
by appealing to expertise.35 Nanay draws on evidence to show that while the visual
attention of experts ranges across the entire composition of a depiction,
untrained viewers tend to restrict their attention to a focal object.36 Berliner,
meanwhile, notes that the ability of a viewer to appreciate properly and to find
aesthetic pleasure in a film hinges on their level of expertise with the kind of film
in question.37 In a tradition like Hollywood film-making, where seeking a wide
audience is central to the practice, making works which accommodate viewers
possessing different degrees of expertise is an important skill. But the crucial point
here, emerging from these arguments on expertise made by Nanay and Berliner,
is that there is no tension between naturalism and the recognition of variability
of response across individuals and groups.
Proust Wasn‘t a Neuroscientist
34 Nanay is similarly emphatic that engaging with the discoveries of the empirical sciences
of mind – which is to say, adopting a naturalistic stance – compels us to take cultural
variation in aesthetics seriously (ibid., x). In this sense, naturalism is not only compatible
with the recognition of variation; where the evidence is there, it pushes us in that
direction.
35 Todd Berliner, Hollywood Aesthetic: Pleasure in American Cinema (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2017).
36 Nanay, Aesthetics as Philosophy of Perception, 26–27.
37 Berliner, Hollywood Aesthetic, 192.
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Throughout this response, I’ve sought to defend the naturalistic but non-
reductive tenor of FACT, by showing how a serious and principled engagement
with neuroscience (and other sciences) need not compromise the distinctiveness
of the aesthetic phenomena – above all, aesthetic experience – that all four
participants in this symposium prize and seek to understand. I am not sure that
I can completely disentangle the elements of clarification, concession, and
creativity that Nanay distinguishes in his response. But I am confident of the value
of all three elements, and thank Irvin and Schellekens for so effectively generating
them with their thoughtful, challenging, and illuminating commentaries.
Murray Smith
Department of Film, University of Kent,
Canterbury, Kent CT2 7UG, United Kingdom
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